

Authority NND 989505By MDP NARA Date 6/11/81In Attendance - Friday, July 9, 1976

Secretary of State Kissinger - Chairman

D	Mr. Robinson
P	Mr. Habib
T	Mr. Maw
M	Mr. Eagleburger
AF	Mr. Blake (Acting)
ARA	Mr. Shlaudeman
EA	Mr. Gleysteen (Acting)
EUR	Mr. Hartman
NEA	Mr. Atherton
INR	Mr. Saunders
S/P	Mr. Lord
EB	Mr. Boeker
S/PRS	Mr. Funseth
PM	Mr. Vest
IO	Mr. Lewis
H	Ambassador McCloskey
L	Mr. Leigh
S/S	Mr. Borg
S	Mr. Aherne
S	Mr. Covey

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: Could I see that Bhutto cable, incidentally? What is the principle on which I'm shown a cable? No possible operational significance -- is that it? (Laughter.)

AMBASSADOR McCLOSKEY: Least need to know is the principle. (Laughter.)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I got the wrong message from you, Larry, yesterday. The message I got was there was a definite decision not to have a press conference in the White House. That's what I got.

MR. EAGLEBURGER: The message I sent to the Secret Service was there apparently would be no press conference; there would be a statement.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That's a total disaster.

Go ahead, Harry.

MR. SHLAUDEMANN: Well, let me just say that it looks very much that this group for Videla in Argentina -- the security forces are totally out of control. We have these daily waves of murders.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Whom are the security forces working for though?

MR. SHLAUDEMANN: They're working for themselves pretty much now.

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes, but in what direction?

MR. SHLAUDEMANN: It's what's turned into a very large-scale Mafia warfare between the security forces and the leftist urban guerrillas. We get our human rights constituents -- who, it sometimes seems to me, are the only ones we have -- clamoring after us all the time about Argentina, because they think it is another Chile -- but it isn't.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It's worse.

MR. SHLAUDEMANN: It's totally different. The Chileans eliminated their opposition, really, in the first 24 hours; but nobody in Argentina is in control of anything. And this thing is a bad situation.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But what could be done if we wanted to do something --

MR. SHLAUDEMANN: I don't think there's anything we can do, frankly.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: -- if they're out of control?

MR. SHLAUDEMANN: I think we have to wait until somebody surfaces to get a handle on this.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Do the security forces work according to some theory? I mean do they have specific

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targets?

MR. SHLAUDEMAM: Yes. I think their theory is that they can use the Chilean method -- that is, to terrorize the opposition -- even by killing priests and nuns and others.

The problem is that they're up against a much tougher situation with the Chileans where the guerrillas are very well organized, very well armed.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But whom do the guerrillas get their support from?

MR. SHLAUDEMAM: They're getting most of their support internally. They have a lot of middle-class supporters.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But where do they get their arms from?

MR. SHLAUDEMAM: They got their arms from killing people and building a very large war chest.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes, but what is their basic orientation?

MR. SHLAUDEMAM: There are two groups -- the ERP and the Montoneros. The ERP are Trotskyites --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That's a great choice we have.

MR. SHLAUDEMAM: -- really.

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: But if these guerrillas are so powerful that even even something doesn't put them down, what are they screaming about -- that they can terrorize and kidnap?

MR. SHLAUDEMANN: That's exactly right.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I mean what is it that should be done? -- because, clearly, these movements aren't going to stop their kidnapping; are they?

MR. SHLAUDEMANN: No, not at all.

I think the difference between the two countries has to be explained -- the difference between these situations -- and the fact is that we can really do nothing at the moment about this situation, I think.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But even if we could, what would we do? Wouldn't the operational consequence of telling the government to lay off be that the terrorists take over -- if the situation is as you've described it?

MR. SHLAUDEMANN: Yes; and I also think that telling them to lay off is fruitless, because the people who are doing it -- they have no real control of it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That's the position. But it isn't just mindless terror either, is it?

MR. SHLAUDEMANN: No -- although it descends to that

level at times.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But on both sides.

MR. SHLAUDEMANN: Very much so. The terror --  
-- the guerrillas are using these bombs increasingly, if  
you say the story about the police chief's daughters'  
best friend who put the bomb under his bed and blew him  
up.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What was she doing in his  
bedroom? (Laughter.)

MR. HABIB: She had gone to study. (Laughter.)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Do you want to do a memo  
for me --

MR. HABIB: I will.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: -- giving me the breakdown  
of the various groups so that I understand what I am  
reading?

MR. HABIB: I will.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: O.K.

Does EA have anything?

MR. GLEYSTEN: Nothing.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I like quiet Bureaus.  
(Laughter.)

MR. GLEYSTEN: I might just say one thing on the